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In fact, as later explored by this note, the Supreme Court has recently 
been issuing opinions that have made it harder for an inventor to obtain a 
patent and easier for an accused infringer to invalidate a patent.13 This
jeopardizes the strength of the American patent system, which in turn, di-
rectly jeopardizes American scientific innovation.14 Patents are essential to 
the American economy because they encourage the proliferation of techno-
logical advancement. Muddied patent jurisprudence hinders America’s 
competitiveness in the global market.15 Perhaps it is time for a more spe-
cialized court to be the final arbiter of patent matters.
This note aims to answer the following questions: 1) can Congress 
strip the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction with respect to hearing 
patent appeals; and 2) should Congress strip this jurisdiction? More specif-
ically, Part II of this note analyzes important Supreme Court cases that 
examine jurisdiction-stripping statutes before considering whether curtail-
ing the Court’s jurisdiction from hearing patent cases would pass constitu-
tional muster. This part also considers any ideological and policy concerns 
associated with this type of statute. Part III explores the importance of pa-
tent law, and assesses recent Supreme Court patent law jurisprudence. The 
note then concludes in Part IV with a reflection on whether this recent 
precedent warrants a consideration of a jurisdiction-stripping statute.
II. CONGRESS CAN STRIP APPELLATE JURISDICTION FROM THE
SUPREME COURT
Jurisdiction-stripping legislation is not novel.16 Throughout history, 
the Court has considered various statutes attempting to limit its jurisdiction. 
Many of these statutes have pertained to habeas corpus challenges, and the 
Court has frequently narrowed its ruling to the specific facts in each case. 
In order to synthesize the case law and apply their holdings to the patent 
world, it is important to examine some of these jurisdiction-limiting stat-
patents claims they should not have upheld, but it has not indicated how to draw the line between 
methods and molecules that are patent-eligible and those that are not.”).
13. Robert R. Sachs, One Year Anniversary: The Aftermath of #ALICESTORM, BILSKI BLOG,
FENWICK & WEST, (June 20, 2015), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2015/06/the-one-year-anniversary-
the-aftermath-of-alicestorm.html (“For example, in TC 1600, the biotech area, in January, 2012 6.81% 
of all actions issued (counting both office actions and notices of allowances) were office actions with 
§ 101 rejections; by May 2015 that percentage almost doubled to 11.86% of actions.”).
14. See generally William Hubbard, COMPETITIVE PATENT LAW, 65 FLA. L. REV. 341, 349 
(2013).
15. See generally Neal Solomon, Connecting the Dots of a Weak Patent System and Productivity 
Growth Decline, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 4, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/10/04/weak-patent-
system-productivity-growth-decline/id=73433/.
16. See e.g., Hooper, supra note 1 at 512.
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utes more in depth. This section first analyzes Supreme Court precedent; it 
subsequently examines the different ideological and policy concerns asso-
ciated with jurisdiction-stripping statutes, coupled with an argument that 
these concerns would not apply to the present inquiry.
A. Supreme Court Case Law on Jurisdiction-Stripping Statutes
One of the first times the Court grappled with a jurisdiction-stripping 
statute was after the Civil War. In 1867, Congress passed an Act that gave 
the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over habeas corpus actions.17 Wil-
liam McCardle, who was imprisoned for publishing allegedly “incendiary 
and libelous” articles, invoked habeas corpus and appealed the decision of 
the lower court to the Supreme Court.18 Before the Supreme Court issued 
its opinion in 1868, Congress repealed the provision that gave the Court 
appellate jurisdiction in these matters.19 The Court noted that under the 
Exceptions Clause, Congress had the power to alter appellate jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court.20 The case was dismissed for want of jurisdiction; 
however, Justice Chase explained, “[t]he act of 1868 does not except from 
that jurisdiction any cases but appeals from Circuit Courts under the act of 
1867.”21 Therefore, the Court’s appellate power in cases of habeas corpus 
was not completely eradicated.22
Another pivotal attempt to restrict appellate review from the Supreme
Court came in 1996 when the Court granted certiorari in Felker v. Turpin.23
With strong support from President Bill Clinton, Congress enacted The 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) of 1996.24 The 
Act contained a provision that restricted the Supreme Court’s appellate 
power.25 More specifically, the AEDPA contained a provision that prevent-
17. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 509 (1868).
18. Id. at 508.
19. Id. at 507–08.
20. Id. at 514.
21. Id. at 507–08.
22. See Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 106 (1868) (“Our conclusion is, that none of the acts prior to 
1867, authorizing this court to exercise appellate jurisdiction by means of the writ of habeas corpus,
were repealed by the act of that year, and that the repealing section of the act of 1868 is limited in 
terms, and must be limited in effect to the appellate jurisdiction authorized by the act of 1867.”).
23. 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
24. Grove, supra note 1, at 286–87.
25. Id. at 287.
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ed the Supreme Court from reviewing a Court of Appeals order denying 
leave to file a second habeas petition by appeal or by writ of certiorari.26
In Felker, the Supreme Court ruled on a narrow construction of the 
provision.27 In this case, the petitioner—convicted of murder, rape, false 
imprisonment, and aggravated sodomy—filed both a motion for stay of 
execution and a motion for leave to file a second or successive federal ha-
beas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Code in the Eleventh Circuit.28
The court denied both motions, and the petitioner filed a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus for appellate review and for stay of execution in the U.S. 
Supreme Court.29
The Court first inquired whether or not the provisions of Title I of the 
AEDPA, which amended existing federal habeas corpus law,30 applied to 
petitions for habeas corpus filed as original matters under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
2241 and 2254;31 it concluded that, while § 2244(b)(3)(E) prohibited it 
from reviewing a judgment on an application for leave to file a second 
habeas petition in district court, Title I did not repeal the Court’s ability to 
entertain original habeas petitions.32 Therefore, the Court held, “since [the 
Act] does not repeal our authority to entertain a petition for habeas corpus, 
there can be no plausible argument that the Act has deprived this Court of 
appellate jurisdiction in violation of Article III, § 2.”33
The AEDPA was soon challenged again in conjunction with the Ille-
gal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(“IIRIRA”).34 These two acts contained amendments to the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (“INA”), which raised questions concerning their ef-
fect on the availability of habeas corpus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
2241.35 In I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, the respondent, a lawful permanent resident of 
the United States, pled guilty in state court to a charge of selling a con-
trolled substance, which made him deportable.36 At that time, the AEDPA 
had not yet been enacted, and, at the discretion of the U.S. Attorney Gen-
26. Felker, 518 U.S. at 656. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(e) (“The grant or denial of an au-
thorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and 
shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.”).
27. Grove, supra note 1, at 289.
28. Felker, 518 U.S. at 657. 
29. Id. at 658.
30. Id. at 656. 
31. Id. at 658. 
32. Id. at 658–62.
33. Id. at 661–62. 
34. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 292 (2001).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 293.
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eral, the respondent would have been eligible for a waiver of deportation.37
However, his removal proceedings had not begun until after both the 
AEDPA and IIRIRA had become effective, and accordingly, the Attorney 
General interpreted the acts to mean that he no longer had discretion to 
grant a waiver.38 The Attorney General also argued that under these stat-
utes, there was no judicial forum available to decide whether these statutes 
deprived him of the power to grant this relief.39 According to the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service (“INS”), four sections of the 1996 statutes 
stripped the courts of jurisdiction with respect to the respondent’s habeas 
corpus application.40
The Court noted that in order for the INS to succeed, it had to over-
come “both the strong presumption in favor of judicial review of adminis-
trative action and the longstanding rule requiring a clear statement of 
congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction.”41 Additionally, the 
Court stated, “Congress must articulate specific and unambiguous statutory 
directives to effect a repeal.”42 The Court indicated that 1) when a certain 
interpretation of a statute “invokes the outer limits of Congress’ power,” 
there should be a “clear indication that Congress intended that result,” and 
2) if “an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious 
constitutional problems, and where an alternative interpretation of the stat-
ute is ‘fairly possible,’”
the Court would be obligated to construe the statute to avoid the con-
stitutional problems.43 “A construction of the amendments at issue that 
would entirely preclude review of a pure question of law by any court 
would give rise to substantial constitutional questions.”44 The Court ulti-
mately concluded that habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 was not repealed by 
AEDPA and IIRIRA since the absence of a judicial forum, “coupled with 
the lack of a clear, unambiguous, and express statement of congressional 
intent to preclude judicial consideration on habeas of such an important 
question of law, strongly counsels against adopting a construction that 
would raise serious constitutional questions.”45
37. Id.
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 297
40. Id. at 298.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 299.
43. Id. at 299–300.
44. Id. at 300.
45. Id. at 314. See also id. at 305. (“It necessarily follows that a serious Suspension Clause issue 
would be presented if we were to accept the INS’ submission that the 1996 statutes have withdrawn that 
power from federal judges and provided no adequate substitute for its exercise.”). Additionally, the 
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In a similar vein, the Supreme Court reviewed a provision of the INA 
that limited judicial review of the Attorney General’s discretionary judg-
ments regarding detention or release of any alien.46 The respondent in
Demore v. Kim was convicted of first-degree burglary and “petty theft with 
priors”; consequently, the INS detained him and charged him with being 
deportable from the United States.47 The respondent filed a habeas corpus 
action challenging the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c),48 arguing 
that his detention violated due process.49
The Court first addressed the argument that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) de-
prived the Court of jurisdiction to entertain the case.50 Section 1226(e) 
stated that “[t]he Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding the 
application of this section shall not be subject to review.”51 It further stated 
that “[n]o court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney Gen-
eral under this section regarding the detention or release of any alien.”52
With regard to the Act’s provisions, the Court held that they did not strip 
the federal courts of the power to review a constitutional challenge to §
1226(c).53 First, the respondent challenged the constitutionality of the statu-
tory framework permitting his detention without bail; he did not challenge 
the “discretionary judgment” or “decision” by the Attorney General.54 Sec-
ond, the Court “has held that ‘where Congress intends to preclude judicial 
review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear.’”55 The
Court further stated, “where a provision precluding review is claimed to bar 
habeas review, the Court has required a particularly clear statement that 
Court stated that if it were to conclude the writ was no longer available in the present situation, its 
holding would be a “departure from historical practice in immigration law.” It is also worth mentioning 
that although the title of section 401(e) seems to show intent to preclude judicial review, the Court 
noted that the actual text “merely repeals a subsection of the 1961 statute amending the judicial review 
provisions of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act,” and that neither the title nor the text mentions 
28 U.S.C. § 2241. Id. at 308–09. 
46. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516 (2003).
47. Id. at 513.
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (dealing with mandatory detention and stating that “the Attorney General 
shall take into custody any alien who” is removable based on a conviction of a specified crime).
49. Demore, 538 U.S. at 514.
50. Id. at 516.
51. Id.
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 517. 
54. Id. at 516–17. 
55. Id. at 517; see also Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (finding that the language and struc-
ture of § 102(c) of the National Security Act indicated that Congress intended to commit individual 
employee discharges to the Director of the CIA’s discretion, and that § 701(a)(2) precludes judicial 
review of these decisions under the Administrative Procedure Act, but also holding that a constitutional 
claim based on an individual discharge may be judicially reviewed by the District Court).
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2017] CONGRESS AND PATENT CASES 687
an alien detained as an enemy combatant, and 2) except as provided in 
sections 1005(e)(2) and (e)(3) of the DTA, no court, justice, or judge will 
have jurisdiction to hear any other action against the United States relating 
to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of 
confinement of a such alien.65 Section 7(b) of the MCA provided that any 
amendments made by 7(a) would apply to all cases, relating to any aspect 
of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of detention of an 
alien, pending on or after the date of the enactment.66
In Boumediene, the petitioners, detainees of Guantanamo Bay, pre-
sented the question of whether or not they were entitled to the “constitu-
tional privilege of habeas corpus, a privilege not to be withdrawn except in 
conformance with the Suspension Clause.”67 The Court ultimately held that 
the Suspension Clause had full effect at Guantanamo Bay, and if Congress 
wanted to deny the privilege of habeas corpus to the detainees, it must act 
in accordance with the requirements of the Suspension Clause.68 The Court 
also decided that section 7 of the MCA was an unconstitutional suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus under the Suspension Clause because the DTA 
review process was not an adequate substitute for the writ of habeas cor-
pus; the Court specifically pointed out that the detainees did not have the 
opportunity to present relevant exculpatory evidence not made part of the 
record in earlier proceedings.69
It is important to note that Congress’ power to strip jurisdiction is still 
subject to Constitutional limitations, such as due process, equal protection, 
and separations of powers.70 For example, in United States v. Klein, Klein, 
an administrator of the deceased V. F. Wilson, brought a claim in the Court 
of Claims to recover the proceeds of cotton belonging to Wilson, which 
came into the possession of agents of the Treasury Department as captured 
or abandoned property during the Civil War.71 Prior case law had held that 
65. Id. at 736. 
66. Id. at 736–37. 
67. Id. at 732. 
68. Id. at 771. 
69. See id. at 792 (“To hold that the detainees at Guantanamo may, under the DTA, challenge the 
President’s legal authority to detain them, contest the CSRT’s findings of fact, supplement the record on 
review with exculpatory evidence, and request an order of release would come close to reinstating the §
2241 habeas corpus process Congress sought to deny them. The language of the statute, read in light of 
Congress’ reasons for enacting it, cannot bear this interpretation.”).
70. Hooper, supra note 1 at 516; see also Battaglia v. Gen. Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d 
Cir. 1948) (stating that Congressional control over jurisdiction is subject to compliance with at least the 
requirements of the Fifth Amendment, meaning that Congress must not exercise its power to restrict the 
jurisdiction of the courts to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of the 
law, or to take private property without just compensation). 
71. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 136 (1871).
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a presidential pardon was proof an individual was innocent in law; it would 
be as if the individual never participated in the rebellion, and therefore, his 
property would be dismissed from any penalty that he might have in-
curred.72 Before the case could reach the Supreme Court, Congress passed 
a statute abandoning this precedent, stating that without a disclaimer of 
guilt, acceptance of a presidential pardon evidenced a person’s support of 
the rebellion.73 Furthermore, Congress stated that this pardon would be 
taken as conclusive evidence of the act recited, and the court would not 
have jurisdiction on proof of pardon or acceptance, summarily made on 
motion or otherwise.74 It also provided that the Supreme Court would have 
no jurisdiction when the Court of Claims rendered a judgment based on the 
pardons, without other proof of loyalty.75
The Court stated that Congress had “passed the limit which separates 
the legislative from the judicial power.”76 It noted that Congress cannot 
“prescribe a rule in conformity with which the court must deny to itself the 
jurisdiction thus conferred, because and only because its decision, in ac-
cordance with settled law, must be adverse to the government and favora-
ble to the suitor.”77 Moreover, the Court noted that the proviso infringed 
the constitutional power of the Executive to grant a pardon; it “impairs the 
executive authority and directs the court to be instrumental to that end.”78
Essentially, there was a separation of powers issue, and the statute was held 
to be unconstitutional.79
B. Application of Case Law to the Present Inquiry
A reasonable question to ask would be: how would these cases apply 
to statutes limiting the Court’s appellate review of patent disputes? First, it 
is important to note that McCardle and Felker are narrow holdings; alt-
hough the Court discussed the Exceptions Clause, it recognized that the 
statutes in question did not deprive the Court from entertaining all habeas
corpus petitions. So, what would happen if Congress wanted to strip juris-
diction from the Court with respect to all patent matters? Boumediene v. 
Bush addressed these questions.
72. Id. at 132–33.
73. Id. at 133–34. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 147. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 148. 
79. Id.
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In Boumediene, the Court held that the MCA deprived the federal 
courts of jurisdiction to hear the contested habeas corpus actions.80 As pre-
viously stated, the Court based its decision on the Suspension Clause,
which states, “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety 
may require it.”81 The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is a privilege 
enumerated in the Constitution, and the MCA deprived the federal courts 
from hearing the detainee’s actions. If Congress were to strip jurisdiction 
from the Supreme Court for patent cases, an inventor would still have ac-
cess to the district courts and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 
There would be no denial of access to a judicial forum, and no denial of a 
Constitutional right.82
Since Boumediene is distinguishable, we can look for guidance in 
I.N.S., Demore, and Klein. I.N.S. and Demore do not speak to the constitu-
tionality of limiting the Court’s patent jurisdiction; however, if Congress 
were to pass a jurisdiction-stripping statute, the cases illustrate that Con-
gress must have clear intent to do so.83 Additionally, unlike in Klein, the 
present inquiry would pass constitutional muster since it does not implicate 
constraints on due process, equal protection, and separations of powers.84
The federal courts, including the Federal Circuit, would still abide by the 
basic principles of equal protection and due process. Moreover, although 
Congress’ power to grant patents is rooted in the Constitution, most patent 
challenges fall under statutory claims, not constitutional claims—a point 
spelled out in further detail below.85 Finally, there is no a separation of 
powers issue since Congress has the constitutional power to govern patent 
rights. Therefore, there is no case law that directly precludes a statute of 
this nature.
C. Addressing Ideological and Policy Concerns of Jurisdiction-
Stripping Statutes
Because there is no case law that directly precludes Congress from 
completely stripping the appellate jurisdiction from the Supreme Court 
with respect to patent cases, this Note examines the ideological and policy 
80. 553 U.S. 723, 723 (2008).
81. U.S. CONST. art. I § 9, cl. 2.
82. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 772 (2008) (“The gravity of the separation-of-powers issues 
raised by these cases and the fact that these detainees have been denied meaningful access to a judicial 
forum for a period of years render these cases exceptional.”).
83. See I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 299–300. 
84. Hooper, supra note 1, at 516. 
85. See infra Part I(c).
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concerns of similar statutes. In the United States, judicial power is enumer-
ated in Article III of the Constitution.86 Article III Section II defines the 
scope of the Supreme Court’s appellate review in the Exceptions Clause.87
This clause is the basis for the textual argument that Congress may restrict 
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.88 Supporters of a broad interpreta-
tion of Congress’ jurisdiction-stripping powers believe that this power 
serves as a check on the unelected judiciary.89 It allows members of Con-
gress, a branch elected by the people, to restrain a branch insulated from 
shifts in political winds.90
Oppositionists to this broad interpretation also look to the text of Arti-
cle III to make their argument, contending that the wording and structure of 
Article III demonstrate a mandatory federal court jurisdiction beyond the 
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.91 Even if Article III does not man-
date the existence of lower federal courts, other scholars have argued that 
all cases and controversies included under the judicial power in Article III 
would still need to be heard by a federal court; consequently, if no inferior 
federal courts existed, claims would need to be heard by the Supreme Court 
on appeal.92 In his article, Weiman contends that these arguments are 
weakened in light of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which failed to “fully vest 
the Article III judicial power in federal courts.”93 He argues that federal 
courts have historically been unable to hear certain cases (e.g., cases that do 
not meet the amount-in-controversy requirements), even though they are 
covered in Article III; therefore, the federal judiciary is not necessarily the 
final arbiter in all matters anyhow.94
Furthermore, the Weiman article references Professor Richard H. Fal-
lon, who has identified two models of judicial federalism: the federalist 
model and the nationalist model.95 Individuals who prescribe to the nation-
alist model believe in the principles of federal supremacy; they may disa-
gree with limiting federal court jurisdiction because they believe that 
86. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2.
87. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
88. Weiman, supra note 1, at 1684. 
89. Id. at 1679.
90. Id. at 1685.
91. Id. at 1685–86 (referring to Justice Story’s dictum in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 
331 (1816) (“It would seem, therefore, to follow, that congress are bound to create some inferior courts, 
in which to vest all that jurisdiction which, under the constitution, is exclusively vested in the United 
States, and of which the supreme court cannot take original cognisance (sic).”).
92. Id. at 1686. 
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1686–87.
95. Id. at 1692.
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federal courts are more apt at enforcing constitutional rights than state 
courts.96 Likewise, Weiman argues that stripping jurisdiction from the fed-
eral courts, specifically the Supreme Court, is that jurisdictional curtailment 
would hinder the Court’s “essential functions.”97 This idea of “essential 
functions” revolves around the theory that the Supreme Court maintains the 
supremacy of federal law and consistency in legal application.98 For exam-
ple, Professor Ratner has argued the “essential appellate functions under 
the Constitution are: (1) to provide a tribunal for the ultimate resolution of 
inconsistent or conflicting interpretations of federal law by state and federal 
courts, and (2) to provide a tribunal for maintaining the supremacy of fed-
eral law when it conflicts with state law or is challenged by state authori-
ty.”99 Through this theory, Professor Ratner contended that procedural 
limitations restricting a litigant’s access to Supreme Court review would 
not normally disrupt the essential functions; however, “legislation denying 
the Court jurisdiction to review any case involving that subject would ef-
fectively obstruct those functions in the proscribed area.”100
Despite the aforementioned ideological and policy concerns, Congress 
should retain the right to limit the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. First, it is 
important to note that Congress does not always have a partisan motive 
when it attempts to strip jurisdiction from the federal courts; rather, it’s 
96. Id. at 1683–84.
97. Id. at 1688.
98. Id. Weiman argues that this is a weak argument because “[t]he fundamental problem with the 
‘essential functions’ theory is that it has not been strongly rooted in constitutional text and fails to 
explain why the Judiciary Act of 1789 limited federal court jurisdiction in a way that did not promote 
uniformity of law.” Id. at 1688.Weisman argues that a narrowed version of this theory would more 
“appropriately represent the text of the Constitution, the views of the framers, and the historical applica-
tions thereafter in laws such as the 1789 Judiciary Act;” “[u]nder this theory, the clear minimum re-
quirement upon Congress would be to maintain ultimate federal court review of state court rulings 
against constitutional claims.” Id. at 1699. See also id. at 1705 (quoting Lawrence Gene Sager, Consti-
tutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 
HARV. L. REV. 17, 44 (1981), who states “[a]s will shortly become clear, I think that the essential 
function claim is strongest when narrowed to Supreme Court review of state court decisions that repu-
diate federal constitutional claims of right.”) Patent law has exclusive federal jurisdiction, and the cases 
and controversies at issue do not deal with constitutional challenges; therefore, the jurisdiction-stripping 
statute in question would easily survive this narrow interpretation.
99. Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 161 (1960).
100. Id. “But legislation that precludes Supreme Court review in every case involving a particular 
subject is an unconstitutional encroachment on the Court’s essential functions.” Id. at 201. 
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motive is much more practical.101 Furthermore, a complete bar to this con-
gressional power would be direct hindrance to Congress.102
Congress has the constitutional right to govern patents;103 under the 
Exceptions Clause, Congress also has the power to utilize this right to gov-
ern patent law by shifting final adjudication of patent appeals from the 
Supreme Court to another court. The two main arguments against stripping 
jurisdiction from the Supreme Court are that 1) under a nationalist model of 
judicial federalism, federal courts are better at enforcing constitutional 
rights than state courts; and 2) stripping jurisdiction from the Supreme 
Court to entertain cases regarding an entire area of law would obstruct the 
Court’s essential functions.
The first issue would not be relevant in the present inquiry. Title 35 of 
the United States Code codifies substantive patent law; cases and contro-
versies primarily deal with infringement and validity matters, rather than 
constitutional challenges. Even if a constitutional challenge were to 
arise,104 there would not be an issue of “federal supremacy,” considering 
that patent law is governed exclusively by federal law.105 Therefore, patent 
law is not subject to discrepancies between state courts and federal 
courts.106
With respect to the second issue, there is no concern regarding the 
presence of “a tribunal for the ultimate resolution of inconsistent or con-
101. See Nicole A. Heise, Stripped: Congress and Jurisdiction Stripping, 3 FAULKNER L. REV. 1
(2011) (citing administrative concerns, like increases in litigation against the federal government, as 
Congress’ catalyst for removing jurisdiction from the courts). 
102. Sager, supra note 98 (“Likewise, these views would prevent Congress from establishing 
special tribunals—in such areas as tax, patent, copyright, or admiralty—whose judgments would be 
immune from Supreme Court review.”).
103. Congress has the power to promote the progress of science by granting inventors the exclu-
sive rights to their discoveries- a power that the Framer’s intended to be broad. In Federalist Paper No. 
43, James Madison referenced the Patent and Copyright clause and concluded that “the utility of this 
power will scarcely be questioned.” THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison). But see Gene Quinn, 
The Constitutional Underpinnings of Patent Law, IPWATCHDOG (May 11, 2011), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/05/11/the-constitutional-underpinnings-of-patent-law/id=16865 
(citing Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966), who notes “[t]he clause is both 
a grant of power and a limitation. This qualified authority, unlike the power often exercised in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the English Crown, is limited to the promotion of advances in 
the ‘useful arts.”).
104. See MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied sub nom. MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co. (U.S. Oct. 11, 2016) (patentee argued that 
inter partes review was unconstitutional because “any action revoking a patent must be tried in an 
Article III court with the protections of the Seventh Amendment.”).
105. 28 USC § 1338(a) (2012).
106. It is worth noting that under the AIA, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) is the 
correct forum for post-grant review (PGR) and inter partes review (IPR) proceedings. Decisions from 
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board regarding these proceedings, however, are appealable to the Federal 
Circuit.
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flicting interpretations of federal law by state and federal courts.”107 As
stated above, a state court does not have jurisdiction to hear a patent 
case.108 However, one may argue that there still may be conflicts among the 
different district courts. This is obviated by the existence of the Federal 
Circuit, a congressionally created court that has appellate jurisdiction over 
the district courts with respect to patent cases. The Federal Circuit may 
behave as the tribunal for the ultimate resolution of inconsistent or conflict-
ing interpretations of patent law; it can set precedent, thereby unifying the 
lower courts.
III. CONGRESS SHOULD CONSIDER A STATUTE STRIPPING THE 
SUPREME COURT’S APPELLATE REVIEW OF PATENT CASES
After determining that Congress likely can strip appellate jurisdiction 
from the Supreme Court with respect to patent cases, it is now time to turn 
to the following question: should Congress strip this jurisdiction? As exam-
ined below, the Supreme Court has taken an increasing interest in patent 
law in recent years, which has seemingly engendered anti-patent precedent. 
Before delving into the case law, it is essential to understand why patent 
law is important to the American public. After that analysis, we will exam-
ine how recent decisions by the Supreme Court have had adverse effects on 
the current state of patent law. This will help us consider whether or not 
jurisdiction-stripping legislation would be appropriate.
A. Patent Law is Essential for Innovation and Vital for the Economy
Technological advancements and scientific discoveries are imperative 
for societal progression. In fact, “[t]he economic philosophy behind the 
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the convic-
tion that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best 
way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors 
in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”109 Anti-patent sentiment and muddied juris-
prudence is lethal to the patent system, which for two centuries has been 
vital to the American economic success.110
107. Ratner, supra note 99 at 161. 
108. But see Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013) (“State legal malpractice claims based 
on underlying patent matters will rarely, if ever, arise under federal patent law for purposes of § 
1338(a).”).
109. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
110. See generally Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Acting Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at 
The Economic Contribution of Technology Licensing Conference USPTO’s Global Intellectual Proper-
ty Academy 6 (June 8, 2016), 
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and global economy, it is imperative that courts, at the least, remain neutral 
when deciding patent cases—even preferably erring on the side of the pa-
tentee. Anti-patent sentiment could spell out danger for both American 
innovation and the American economy.
B. The Current State of Patent Law
Now that this Note has illustrated the importance that patents hold in 
our society, we must turn our attention to the Supreme Court’s objectiona-
ble treatment of patent law. First, the Supreme Court has been reversing 
very important decisions by the Federal Circuit, a court Congress specifi-
cally created to hear specialized cases. Next, the Supreme Court has been 
misinterpreting Congress’ interpretation of Title 35 as well as the scientific 
and technical facts behind certain cases. These reversals, as well as the
ongoing legal and factual misinterpretations, have created confusion in 
patent law jurisprudence, which in turn has made it more difficult for an 
inventor to both obtain and retain a patent.
1. The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit: A Love Story Gone 
Wrong.
In the beginning, the Supreme Court mainly left the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit at peace; however, in recent years, the Supreme 
Court has ostensibly been disregarding Federal Circuit jurisprudence.120 In
1982, Congress established the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit (“Federal Circuit”). Congress created the Federal Circuit in order to 
Patent Court Agreement is a treaty between certain European Union member states creating a single
Unified Patent Court system; the UPC will handle infringement and validity cases for participating EU 
states. For more information on the Unified Patent Court, see An Enhanced European Patent System, 
UPC (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.unified-patent-court.org/images/documents/enhanced-european-
patent-system.pdf;20, 2016; see also UP & UPC FAQs, FISH & RICHARDSON (July 12, 2016), 
http://www.fr.com/global/unitary-patent-faqs/.http://www.fr.com/global/unitary-patent-faqs/.
120. Since its creation, the Federal Circuit has elicited strong criticism among legal scholars. One 
argument is that since the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over patent law appeals, there is 
little room for different legal interpretations to be tried and tested among the various circuits. Many 
people feel that the Federal Circuit is very pro-patent, arguing that a specialized court with exclusive 
jurisdiction would be inherently biased. See Zachary Shapiro, Patent Law, Expertise, and the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, BILL OF HEALTH BLOG (July 14, 2015), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2015/07/14/patent-law-expertise-and-the-court-of-appeals-for-
the-federal-circuit.). However, this bias pales in comparison to the confusing and seemingly anti-patent 
precedent set by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, critics of the Federal Circuit also argue that patent 
law should not be treated “differently” from other areas of law. The argument is that patent cases are 
actually not inherently more challenging than any other type of law. See Wood, supra note 11. On the 
contrary, patent law is a distinct field, whose jurisprudence affects the American economy. Additional-
ly, it is still one of the few fields that requires a separate bar examination, which further demonstrates 
its legal uniqueness.
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provide more “certain areas of federal jurisdiction and relieve the pressure 
on the dockets of the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals for the re-
gional circuits.”121 The Federal Circuit was formed after years of extensive 
research and study.122 Results of this study pointed to problems associated 
with the lack of uniformity in specialized areas of law, including patent 
law.123 Congress extended the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit so that 
they “had the power to review appeals from the U.S. Court of International 
Trade, the Merit Services Protection Board, the board of contract appeals, 
and certain administrative decisions of the secretaries of Agriculture and 
Commerce, as well as all appeals related to patents.”124
The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have a recent history of 
tension. For example, between 2005 and 2015, the Supreme Court heard 27 
patent appeals from the Federal Circuit, and the Court reversed 22 of 
them.125 The Supreme Court grants certiorari to many of these cases in 
attempts to synchronize patent law with the rest of the law. The Federal 
Circuit, however, narrowly applies these rulings. For instance, the Federal 
Circuit held that isolated DNA was patentable twice before the Supreme 
Court finally reversed Myriad.126 Speaking about the uniformity of circuit 
court decisions, Chief Justice John Roberts even joked, “Well, they don’t 
have a choice, right? They can’t say, ‘I don’t like the Supreme Court rule, 
so I’m not going to apply it—other than the Federal Circuit.’”127
121. Landmark Judicial Legislation, FED. JUD. CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_22.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2016).
122. Id. 
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Steven Seidenberg, Tug-of-war over Interpretations of Patent Law Continues between Feder-
al Circuit and SCOTUS, ABA J., (Jan. 1, 2016, 3:00 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/tug_of_war_over_interpretations_of_patent_law_continue
s_between_federal. See also Timothy B. Dyk, Thoughts on the Relationship Between the Supreme 
Court and the Federal Circuit, 16 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 67, 67 (2016) (“In the past ten years, the 
Supreme Court has taken an average of four of our cases each term, representing 5.4% of the Court’s
merits cases. A large proportion of those cases have involved substantive patent law or related proce-
dural issues.”).
126. Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013).
127. Seidenberg, supra note 125 (citing oral arguments for Carlsbad Technology Inc. v. HIF Bio 
Inc.). See also Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 783 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding, on 
remand, that under the Supreme Court’s revised “reasonable certainty” test, the claims still complied 
with Section 112). In this case, the Federal Circuit stated, “we may now steer by the bright star of 
‘reasonable certainty,’ rather than the unreliable compass of ‘insoluble ambiguity,’” which can be 
construed as a “snarky” response to the Supreme Court’s shift from the “insolubly ambiguous” standard 
to the reasonable certainty test. Erin Coe, The Battle for Patent Law: Federal Circuit Looks to Hold the 
Line as Supreme Court Eyes IP, LAW360 (July 9, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/814461/the-
battle-for-patent-law. 
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A recent example of the tension between the Federal Circuit and the 
Supreme Court can be seen in the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Apple v. 
Samsung,128 which collides with the Supreme Court’s ruling in eBay v. 
MercExchange.129 In eBay, the Supreme Court stated that Court of Appeals 
did not correctly apply the traditional four-factor framework that governs 
the award of injunctive relief, but instead used a unique “general rule that a 
permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been 
adjudged.” The Circuit felt injunctions should only be denied in the “‘unu-
sual case’, ‘under ‘exceptional circumstances’ and ‘in rare instances . . . to 
protect the public interest.’”130 The four-factor test that the Court applied is 
the same four-factor test applied in other civil cases involving awarding 
permanent injunctive relief. This four-factor test states that
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable inju-
ry; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are in-
adequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance 
of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is 
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a 
permanent injunction.131
In the aftermath of this case, patentees acquired far fewer injunctions, 
and “[t]hey also found it nearly impossible to obtain an injunction when an 
infringed patent was just a tiny part of a large, complex product or ser-
vice.”132 This was because courts have consistently held that an infringing 
element must drive consumer demand in order for irreparable harm to ex-
ist.133
This holding is in tension with the recent Apple v. Samsung deci-
sion.134 In its opinion, the Federal Circuit adopted a pro-patentee interpreta-
tion of “irreparable harm.”135 Furthermore, in relation to the last factor of 
the test, the Federal Circuit went on to say that
[w]e base this conclusion not only on the Patent Act’s statutory right to 
exclude, which derives from the Constitution, but also on the importance 
of the patent system in encouraging innovation. Injunctions are vital to 
this system. As a result, the public interest nearly always weighs in favor 
128. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 809 F.3d 633, 647 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
129. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006). See Seidenberg, supra note
125 (discussing the difficulty in reconciling Apple v. Samsung with eBay, Inc.).
130. eBay, Inc., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (citing MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d, at 
1338). 
131. Id. at 391. 
132. Seidenberg, supra note 125.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????? ??????????????????????? ??????? ??????? ???? ??? ?????????????? ?????????? ???? ??????????
?????????????????????????????????????????Id.???????????
? ????? ?See ?????? ??? ??????????????, Understanding the Federal Circuit: An Expert Community 
Approach, ?????????????????? ????? ???? ??? ?????? ???????????????????????? ??????????? ??????????? ????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????
???????????????
? ????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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had infringed its patent for an adjustable pedal system.142 KSR counter 
claimed that the patent was obvious under 103.143 The Court ruled in favor 
of KSR, and established principles to help determine obviousness.144 In its 
opinion, the Court held that the “teaching-suggestion-motivation test” uti-
lized by the Federal Circuit was helpful insight to identify a reason for 
combining prior art; however, the Court stated that it should not be used as 
a strict rule.145
The Court stated that it would be necessary for a court to look to “in-
terrelated teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands known to 
the design community or present in the marketplace; and the background 
knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art, all in 
order to determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the 
known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.”146 Moreo-
ver, according to the Court, a court may take into account the “inferences 
and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would em-
ploy.”147 This shows that, according to the Court, combination patents de-
serve extra scrutiny, which may present a concern of hindsight bias.148
According to an article from the Albany Law Journal, district courts stud-
ied in the article were over seven times more likely to find patents obvious 
based on the KSR holding, and the Federal Circuit was 40%–57% more 
likely to find a patent obvious on review.149
Consistency is important for a field that is so closely tied with the 
American economy. As this Note will explore further in its next section, 
these flexible approaches not only create inconsistency, but they also are 
purportedly harmful for patents. Furthermore, by setting these new stand-
ards, the Court is not just rejecting the Federal Circuit’s patent law juris-
142. Id. at 405–06. 
143. Id. at 406. 
144. Id. at 415–18. (“When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and 
other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or a different one. If a person of 
ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability. For the same 
reason, if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art 
would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious 
unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill. Sakraida and Anderson’s–Black Rock are illustra-
tive—a court must ask whether the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements 
according to their established functions.”).
145. Id. at 419. 
146. Id. at 418.
147. Id. See also id. at 421 (“A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not 
an automaton.”). 
148. See id. at 421.
149. Ali Mojibi, An Empirical Study of the Effect of KSR v. Teleflex on the Federal Circuit’s
Patent Validity Jurisprudence, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 559, 596 (2010),
http://www.albanylawjournal.org/documents/articles/20.3.559-mojibi.pdf.
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diseases, like Crohn’s disease.158 The Court held that these claims covered 
phenomena of nature, and any additional steps were “well-understood, 
routine, conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific commu-
nity.”159 In this decision, Justice Breyer admitted that the additional steps in 
the claim “are not themselves natural laws;” however, he continued that the 
additional steps still did not transform the nature of the claim.160 This inter-
pretation seemingly goes against Congress’ legislative intent for a broad 
construction of § 101.
Further interpreting the test delineated in Mayo, the Court decided Al-
ice Corp. v. CLS Bank in 2014.161 In this case, the Supreme Court held that 
the claims on review contained patent-ineligible subject matter.162 The 
Court relied on a two-part test to determine eligibility set out in Mayo.163
First, the Court determined whether the claims were directed to an abstract 
idea. In Alice, the Court turned to Bilski v. Kappos to analyze the category 
of abstract ideas.164 In Bilski, the Court concluded that the claims were 
directed to a method for hedging against the financial risk of price fluctua-
tions.165 Using this precedent for its decision, the Court stated that the 
claims in Alice were directed to “using a third-party intermediary to miti-
gate settlement risk.”166 Much like the claims in Bilski, the Court felt the 
claims in Alice encompassed “a fundamental economic practice long preva-
lent in our system of commerce.”167
158. Id. 
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1297. (“To put the matter more succinctly, the claims inform a relevant audience about 
certain laws of nature; any additional steps consist of well-understood, routine, conventional activity 
already engaged in by the scientific community; and those steps, when viewed as a whole, add nothing 
significant beyond the sum of their parts taken separately. For these reasons we believe that the steps 
are not sufficient to transform unpatentable natural correlations into patentable applications of those 
regularities.”).
161. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
162. Id. at 2352. 
163. Id. at 2355 (The first step in the test is to determine whether the claims at issue are directed to 
a patent-ineligible concept; if yes, a court must ask “[w]hat else is there in the claims before us? [A 
court should] consider the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to 
determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible 
application.”).
164. Id. at 2355.
165. Id. at 2355–56 (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 599 (2010)) (“Claim 1 [in Bilski]
recited a series of steps for hedging risk, including: (1) initiating a series of financial transactions 
between providers and consumers of a commodity; (2) identifying market participants that have a 
counterrisk for the same commodity; and (3) initiating a series of transactions between those market 
participants and the commodity provider to balance the risk position of the first series of consumer 
transactions. Claim 4 ‘pu[t] the concept articulated in claim 1 into a simple mathematical formula.’”)
(internal citations omitted).
166. Id. at 2356.
167. Id.
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applications had been abandoned.175 If an application is abandoned before 
publication, the public does not benefit because there is no disclosure; 
however, if it is abandoned after publication, a company risks disclosing an 
unpatented invention to a competitor.176 Moreover, one of the most shock-
ing parts of the Alice decision is that in no part of the opinion does the 
Court mention the word “software.” This is noteworthy due to Alice’s dire 
effects on software patents.177
Soon after Alice, the Federal Circuit issued an opinion holding in fa-
vor of the patentee.178 In this case, the court stated that the claims satisfied 
step two of the test delineated in Mayo/Alice.179 The court held that the 
claims were patent-eligible because
They do not merely recite the performance of some business practice 
known from the pre- Internet world along with the requirement to per-
form it on the Internet. Instead, the claimed solution is necessarily rooted 
in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically aris-
ing in the realm of computer networks.180
Although this decision seemed to be a beacon of hope for patent own-
ers, an article written in 2015 stated that only nine district court opinions 
have used DDR as precedent to find patent eligibility, while over thirty 
court opinions have cited DDR as inapplicable.181 Moreover, in the year 
since the article published, the Federal Circuit decided more than twice as 
many cases as the previous year, yet it still found very few cases with pa-
tent-eligible claims; this means that since Alice, there has been little case 
law a patent owner can rely on if his or her software patent is challenged.182
175. Robert R. Sachs, Two Years after Alice: A Survey of the Impact of a “Minor Case” (Part 2),
FENWICK & WEST: BILSKI BLOG (June 20, 2016), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2016/06/two-years-
after-alice-a-survey-of-the-impact-of-a-minor-case-part-2.html (basing statistic 
on published applications, which, according to the author, have historically accounted for 60% of all 
patent applications; consequently, he contends that the numbers are likely higher). 
176. Id. 
177. See Austin Underhill, Who Is Alice, And Why Is She Driving Patent Attorneys Mad as Hat-
ters?, ABOVE THE LAW (Feb. 19, 2016, 1:52 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2016/02/who-is-alice-and-
why-is-she-driving-patent-attorneys-mad-as-hatters. The Alice decision has also had a great effect on 
business method patents. As of June 2016, the PTAB has granted 83.6% of petitions seeking Covered 
Business Method (CBM) review that considered a § 101 argument on the merits; the PTAB reaffirmed 
96% of those decisions as Final Decisions.). Sachs, supra note 13.
178. DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
179. Id. at 1257–59. 
180. Id. at 1257. 
181. Sachs, supra note 13.
182. Sachs, supra note 13; See Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
This recent case possibly brings clarification to Section 101 jurisprudence. The Federal Circuit deter-
mined that the claims at issue were directed to a self-referential table for a computer database rather 
than an abstract idea. Id. at 1335–36 (“We do not read Alice to broadly hold that all improvements in 
computer-related technology are inherently abstract and, therefore, must be considered at step two . . . .
For that reason, the first step in the Alice inquiry in this case asks whether the focus of the claims is on 
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This high rate of invalidation raises concerns for inventors. Why 
would an inventor waste his or her time and money filing for a patent ap-
plication, when there is a high likelihood that it will be invalidated? Fur-
thermore, what does this new jurisprudence do to the presumption of 
validity?183 Is this presumption merely a hollow word? Innovation is vital 
to the wellbeing of society. Furthermore, the Constitution enumerates Con-
gress’ power to promote the sciences;184 therefore, courts should not be 
weakening patent rights, they should be encouraging patent rights.
Besides invalidating patents with its broad approach to § 101, the Su-
preme Court also seems to intermix the analysis for patent eligibility under 
§ 101 with the analysis for patentability under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 
(hereinafter “§ 102” and “§103,” respectively).185 According to § 102, an 
invention must be novel.186 This means that the claimed invention cannot 
have been “patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on 
sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of 
the claimed invention.”187 Section 103 states that an inventor may not re-
ceive a patent if the “subject matter as a whole would have been obvious 
before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having 
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.”188 The sec-
the specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities (i.e., the self-referential table for a computer 
database) or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked 
merely as a tool.”). In another recent case, the Federal Circuit discussed the problems with abstraction, 
and proceeded to analyze the claims at issue by examining earlier cases “in which a similar or parallel 
descriptive nature can be seen.” Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., No. 2015-1180, 2016 
WL 6440387 at *4, (Fed. Cir. Nov. 1, 2016) (“The problem with articulating a single, universal defini-
tion of ‘abstract idea’ is that it is difficult to fashion a workable definition to be applied to as-yet-
unknown cases with as-yet-unknown inventions. That is not for want of trying; to the extent the efforts 
so far have been unsuccessful it is because they often end up using alternative but equally abstract terms 
or are overly narrow.”). See also id. at *4 n.1 (“For examples, compare [In re Bilski] reaffirming ‘ma-
chine-or-transformation’ as the § 101 test for process claims, with [Bilski v. Kappos] indicating that 
‘machine-or-transformation’ is perhaps one possible test, but not the only one. See also the several 
opinions in this court’s [CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp.].”). 
183. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2016).
184. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
185. Eric Guttag, Ignorance Is Not Bliss: Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, IP WATCHDOG
(July 25, 2014),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/07/25/ignorance-is-not-bliss-alice-corp-v-cls-bank-
international/id=50517. See also Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1304. (“We recognize that, in evaluating the 
significance of additional steps, the §101 patent-eligibility inquiry and, say, the §102 novelty inquiry 
might sometimes overlap.”).
186. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
187. Id. The claimed invention also cannot have been described in a patent issues under section 
151, or in an application for a patent published under 122(b), wherein the patent or application was filed 
before the effective filing date of the claimed invention. It is important to note that this is the language 
used post-American Invents Act of 2011.
188. 35 U.S.C. § 103; see Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 1 (1966) (deline-
ating factors to determine the obviousness framework).
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ond part of the analysis in the Alice decision, which is the quest for the 
inventive concept, seems to combine the analyses required under each stat-
ute. In part two of the test, the Court states that abstract ideas are patent-
ineligible when the additional steps of the claims are routine and well un-
derstood by those in the scientific community.189 By its very nature, deter-
mining whether or not steps are routine and well understood by those 
skilled in the art requires consideration of novelty and non-obviousness.190
When the § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry overlaps with the § 102 and 
§ 103 analyses, there is a risk of creating significantly greater legal uncer-
tainty. This combination of sections makes it easier to challenge a patent’s 
validity on § 101 grounds. For example, a challenger could use a combina-
tion of the written description and the prior art to allege that the patent 
claims are routine and conventional.191 It also ignores the legislative history 
behind Congress’ 1952 Patent Act, which states that anything under the sun 
made by man is patentable. Furthermore, by re-codifying the patent law, 
Congress has shown that patent eligible subject matter is only one require-
ment needed to obtain a patent.
Finally, when the Supreme Court weakens patent rights, it affects 
Congress’ enumerated ability to promote science. The Supreme Court’s 
declaratory judgment jurisprudence arguably weakens patent rights. In 
order to file a declaratory judgment action in the district courts, the party 
filing the suit must establish the existence of an actual case or controversy 
between itself and the opposing party.192 In a patent case, a declaratory 
judgment is a legally binding declaration, in which a court conclusively 
affirms the rights of a party (e.g., determines a patent’s validity or declares 
non-infringement). A cornerstone case in the interpretation of this law oc-
curred in Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.193
In Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., MedImmune had a licensing 
agreement with Genentech, which covered an existing patent and a then-
pending patent application.194 When the USPTO granted the pending appli-
cation, Genentech sent MedImmune a letter stating it expected them to pay 
189. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2359 (2014).
190. See Jason Rantanen, Guest Post: The Blurring of §§ 101 and 103—A Double-Edged Sword 
that Cuts the Other Way, PATENTLYO (Oct. 6, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/10/blurring-
%C2%A7%C2%A7-double.html (“In Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298, for example, Justice Breyer cited 
admissions in the specification that the processes for determining the level of metabolites in a patient’s
blood were ‘well known in the art’.”). 
191. Id.
192. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2016).
193. MedImmune v. Genentech, 549 U.S. 118, 118 (2007).
194. Id. at 121. 
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royalties.195 MedImmune alleged that Genentech’s patent was invalid and 
that their product did not infringe its claims; however, they still paid royal-
ties on the patent.196 The petitioner then sought declaratory relief.197 The
Court considered whether a patent licensee had to first terminate its licens-
ing agreement in order to satisfy the actual controversy requirement under 
the Declaratory Judgment Act.198 The Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s 
decision and held that MedImmune was not required to break its licensing 
agreement in order to seek a declaratory judgment in federal court, which 
would render the underlying patent invalid, unenforceable, or not in-
fringed.199
Before this case, the Federal Circuit applied a reasonable apprehen-
sion standard in order to determine whether or not the case-or-controversy 
requirement had been satisfied.200 In its place, the Court held that they must 
consider “whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that 
there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal 
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a 
declaratory judgment.”201 By considering all the circumstances, the Court 
has essentially lowered the bar for bringing a declaratory judgment ac-
tion.202 In lowering the bar for bringing a declaratory judgment action, a 
licensee has the advantage of remaining in good standing, all while attack-
ing the validity of a patent.203 The consequence of this is that the bargain-
ing power of both parties entering a licensing agreement is greatly 
shifted.204 Ultimately, the shift in negotiation power creates a huge imbal-
ance.205
As of now, there are not many consequences to challenging the validi-
ty of a licensor’s patent.206 This may discourage potential licensing agree-
ments, which, in turn, could possibly hinder future innovation.207
Essentially, “the overhead cost associated with licensing a patent is now 
195. Id. 
196. Id. at 121–22.
197. Id. at 122. 
198. Id. at 128. 
199. Id. at 137. 
200. See id. at 132 n.11.
201. Id. at 127. 
202. Nicholas G. Smith, Medimmune v. Genentech: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Supreme 
Court’s Continued Assault on the Patentee, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 503, 527 (2011).
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. 
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greater because of the imbalance of power between patentees and licensees, 
which decreases the value of a patent sought to be licensed.”208 Another 
major issue with the MedImmune decision is that it makes it more difficult 
to monetize patents.209 After MedImmune, there is now a risk of having a 
patent declared invalid before licensing or litigation ever occurs.210 This 
results in a shift in the balance of power in licensing negations; “the risk 
partially shifts away from the licensee to the patent holder.”211 Because 
value is a function of risk, the value of the patent could be adversely affect-
ed.212
Additionally, attorneys will now have to consider alternative contract 
provisions in order to avoid declaratory judgments actions.213 This could 
greatly increase transactional costs and add risk to the licensing process 
since parties may be apprehensive to enter into a licensing agreement with 
these provisions.214 Furthermore, the possibility of litigation increases, as a 
licensee has little to lose from accepting a license before turning immedi-
ately to the courts.215 Companies are discouraged from seeking licenses for 
their patents to an expansive group, considering they may be faced with 
multiple validity and non-infringement challenges.216 Potential licensors 
will have to take extra time to consider each and every possible licensee 
before entering into any agreement.217 This could cause a problem because 
patents may be transferred to the least risky user instead of a valuable enti-
ty.218 In sum, the Supreme Court has not given the proper deference to 
Congress, and has in turn made it difficult for an inventor to enforce his or 
her patent- an effect contrary to Congressional intent.
208. Id.
209. Peter Jay, Removing Incentives for Technology Transfer: Medimmune v. Genentech, 5 BUFF.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 69, 83 (2007).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 81.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 82.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. For another analysis on the potential impact of MedImmune, see Ahmend & Diner, In the 
Aftermath of MedImmune v. Genentech, Is It All Doom and Gloom for Licensors or Are There Rays of 
Hope in the Future? FINNEGAN (Apr. 2007), 
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=6c82c943-80d3-44d1-8587-
fc608b1ff322; see also Scott G. Greene, The Return of the King: Rethinking Lear, Medimmune, and the 
Effects of Licensee Estoppel in the Context of Aia Post-Grant Procedures, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 81, 105 (2015) (“The jurisprudence following MedImmune has resulted in a significant broadening of 
scenarios under which a licensee or prospective licensee is able to bring a patent invalidity challenge.”).
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ultimate conclusion, but rather the reasoning behind it. Perhaps most mem-
bers of the Court fell asleep during their freshman year biology course, as 
perhaps some of this Note’s readers did.228 Consequently, it is important to 
briefly discuss both isolated DNA as well as cDNA.
Genes carry the instructions to make proteins.229 They are made up of 
DNA, and they can vary in size from a few hundred bases to more than two 
million bases.230 In nature, the human genome contains about 3 billion base 
pairs in total.231 These base pairs reside in the twenty-three pairs of chro-
mosomes contained in the nucleus of our cells.232 Chromosomes consist of 
hundreds to thousands of genes.233 “Each of the estimated 30,000 genes in 
the human genome makes an average of three proteins.”234 In nature, genes 
clearly do not exist in a vacuum. An isolated fragment of DNA is not natu-
rally occurring, and locating, sequencing, and isolating one specific gene 
out of 30,000 genes can be a rigorous process. The Supreme Court even 
points out, “isolating DNA from the human genome severs chemical bonds 
and thereby creates a nonnaturally occurring molecule.”235 But still, the 
Court holds that the isolated DNA claims cover naturally occurring phe-
nomena, which seems somewhat paradoxical.236
The Court comes to this conclusion because the genetic information 
encoded in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes itself was not altered.237 Assum-
ing, arguendo, that this is the proper analysis, and that judges should look 
to the underlying genetic information, the Court should have come to a 
different conclusion with respect to the patentability of cDNA. Here, the 
antidote to the politics of the human gene patenting debate, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 6th, 2013), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/an-antidote-to-the-politics-of-the-human-gene-patenting-debate/ 
(arguing that patenting isolated human DNA does not 1) inhibit innovation, 2) inhibit genetic research,
or 3) inhibit future technologies, such as personalized medicine).
228. It is worth mentioning that the syllabus of the decision refers to synthetically created “exons-
only strands of nucleotides” as “composite DNA (cDNA).” Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2109. In molecular 
biology, cDNA stands for complementary DNA; Noah Feldman, The Supreme Court’s Bad Science on 
Gene Patents, BLOOMBERG LAW, (June 13 2013), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-06-
13/the-supreme-court-s-bad-science-on-gene-patents; Noam Prywes, The Supreme Court’s Sketchy 
Science, SLATE,
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2013/06/supreme_court_patent_case_science
_the_justices_misunderstand_molecular_biology.html.
229. The Human Genome Project Completion: Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L HUMAN 
GENOME RESEARCH INST. (Oct. 30, 2010).
230. Id. 
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2118. (emphasis added).
236. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116–19.
237. Id.
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Court argues that a person creates something new when cDNA is made, 
mostly because cDNA differs from natural DNA in that cDNA does not 
contain the non-coding regions.238 The Court focuses more on how the 
cDNA is made, rather than its underlying genetic information.
cDNA is made from mRNA.239 During transcription, RNA polymer-
ase II uses a strand of DNA as a template to make a complementary strand 
of RNA, called pre-mRNA.240 In nature, pre-mRNA undergoes a process 
called splicing.241 The purpose of splicing is to remove introns, which are 
sequences of RNA that do not contain instructions for protein construc-
tion.242 The remaining segments are called exons, which are the part of the 
mRNA that contain instructions for protein assembly.243 The spliced 
mRNA can be referred to as primary mRNA.244 How does this relate to 
cDNA? Well, cDNA is usually generated by the enzyme reverse transcrip-
tase, which uses the information in primary mRNA to produce a comple-
mentary DNA strand.245 Complementary DNA contains the same protein-
coding information found in a segment of “natural” DNA;246 therefore, the 
analysis for cDNA should really be no different from the Court’s analysis 
for isolated DNA.
It is worth mentioning that, in his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia 
wrote, “I join the judgment of the Court, and all of its opinion except Part 
I–A and some portions of the rest of the opinion going into fine details of 
molecular biology. I am unable to affirm those details on my own 
knowledge or even my own belief.”247 In a criminal or any other civil case, 
the judge is expected to know and fully understand the facts and how they 
apply to existing law. Why shouldn’t the same standard be held for a patent 
matter? In a case that affects genetic researching and the biotechnology 
industry,248 the Court should have been able to understand the actual bio-
logical facts in order to make a proper decision.249
238. Id. at 2119.
239. See Isolation and Use of cDNA Clones, http://www-
users.med.cornell.edu/~jawagne/cDNA_cloning.html.
240. See Eukaryotic Gene Transcription: Going from DNA to mRNA, KHAN ACADEMY,
https://www.khanacademy.org/test-prep/mcat/biomolecules/dna/a/eukaryotic-gene-transcription-going-
from-dna-to-mrna
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See Isolation and Use of cDNA Clones, supra note 239.
246. Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013).
247. Id. at 2120.
248. See Esteban Burrone, Patents at the Core: the Biotech Business, WIPO,
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IV. CONCLUSION
Innovation is the key to success in this globalized world. Over the past 
few years, the Supreme Court has made many errors in patent jurispru-
dence, which has put innovation at risk.250 Is stripping jurisdiction from the 
Supreme Court the answer? Congress would not be precluded from passing 
this type of jurisdiction-stripping legislation. Furthermore, certain ideologi-
cal and policy concerns stimulated by previous jurisdiction-stripping stat-
utes are not at issue here. In the simplest scenario, the Federal Circuit 
would be the final arbiter of patent appeals, still allowing for uniform juris-
prudence and judicial checks on any equal protection, due process, or sepa-
ration of powers claims, if any constitutional claims ever were to arise.
Although the Supreme Court can strip jurisdiction with respect to the 
Court’s ability to entertain patent appeals, the real question lies in whether 
or not Congress should pass this legislation. Stripping jurisdiction is a con-
troversial idea, and some may argue that it may be too soon to make that 
judgment. What is clear, however, is that there needs to be some reform in 
the Supreme Court’s patent law jurisprudence. Maybe a simple solution 
would be to ensure that at least one justice on the Court is registered to 
practice before the USPTO. Or, another possible solution would be to ap-
point a technical advisor to the justices, who could assist the Court in inter-
preting any scientifically complex case.
The idea of having a scientifically trained person on a patent court is 
not novel. For example, in the German patent system, there are twenty-nine 
boards in which judges of the Federal Patent Court can sit, which include 
nullity boards, technical boards of appeal, boards of appeal for trademarks, 
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/patents_biotech_fulltext.html (“Compared with other major 
industries that also rely on research and development (R&D), such as the chemical industry, for which 
the ratio of R&D expenditure to total revenues is approximately 5%, or the pharmaceutical industry, for 
which the equivalent figure is generally no more than 13%, biotechnology companies generally invest a 
significantly higher proportion of their revenues in R&D (often between 40% and 50%). As in any 
research-based industry, the protection of research results becomes a major issue.”).
249. Mayo and Myriad have also impacted the ability to acquire and secure biotech related patents. 
Sachs, supra note 13 (displaying figure directed to patents challenged in Federal Courts, which shows 
that 53% of biotech related patents have been invalidated under § 101). 
250. See Ryan Davis, Kappos Calls for Abolition of Section 101 Of Patent Act, LAW360 (Apr. 12,
2016, 4:32 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/783604/kappos-calls-for-abolition-of-section-101-of-
patent-act. According to this article, David Kappos, the former director of the USPTO, called for the 
abolition of Section 101 of the Patent Act, stating decisions like Alice on the issue are a “real mess” and 
threaten patent protection for key U.S. industries. He stated that the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Mayo, Myriad, and Alice, along with the lower interpretations of these decisions by the lower courts, 
have made it too difficult to procure patents on biotechnology and software inventions. According to 
Kappos, foreign patent officials have reacted with “bemusement” while watching the U.S. invalidate 
patents under Section 101. According to Kappos, foreign companies competing with American busi-
nesses see a golden opportunity in the reduced patent protection for software and biotechnology.
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a juridical board of appeal, a board of appeal for utility models, and a board 
of appeal in plant variety cases.251 On this court, there are currently 118 
judges; these judges are a mixture of lawyers and scientists.252 These tech-
nical judges have all the same duties and privileges of a professional judge; 
they sit on all cases involved in the properties of a technical invention.253
The implementation of technically trained judges has existed in specialized 
patent courts in various countries, like Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, and 
Denmark.254 In the United Kingdom, patent law judges usually have scien-
tific and technical training; however, they are not officially referred to as 
technical judges.255 Actually, an advantage to stripping jurisdiction could 
be that Congress would have the power to alter the Federal Circuit so that 
is better emulates the European system.
It might be worth Congress’s time and energy to study the patent sys-
tems of other countries; however, that is for another note. Although there 
may be other solutions to an increasingly foreboding situation, stripping 
jurisdiction from the Supreme Court is a rational consideration. Due to 
their importance in the American and global economy, patents should at 
least be analyzed neutrally. Supreme Court opinions in recent years have 
put patent law on shaky grounds. The Supreme Court has not granted def-
erence to the congressionally created Federal Circuit, nor has it granted 
deference to Congress’ legislative intent. Furthermore, the Court occasion-
ally misunderstands the science behind the case law, thereby limiting its 
ability to communicate clear, uniform rules. It’s time to reform the judici-
ary in order to stop the cessation, and promote innovation.
251. Functions, BUNDES PATENT GERICHT,
https://www.bundespatentgericht.de/cms/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2&Itemid=
8&lang=en.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Xavier Seuba, Inside Views: CEIPI Launches Training Program for Technical Judges of 
Unified Patent Court, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Sept. 29, 2015),
http://www.ip-watch.org/2015/09/29/ceipi-launches-training-program-for-technical-judges-of-unified-
patent-court/.
255. Id. The Unified Patent Court would also seat technical judges.

